Three experiments examined the latent structure of values. Participants rated the importance of values clustered in pairs. Based on [Schwartz, S. H. (1992) . Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 1-65). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.] circular model, we predicted and found that the time to rate the second value in each pair was shorter when the two values were motivationally congruent or opposing than when the two values were unrelated (Experiment 1). As expected, this was not the case when participants had to compare the importance of values within each pair (Experiment 2). Finally, semantic relatedness between values failed to explain the eVects of motivational compatibility (Experiment 3). Taken together, these results reveal a coherent pattern of value relations driven by motivational compatibilities, over and above perceived semantic relatedness.
Introduction
The topic of the present research is at the core of many debates over social issues and policy. In these debates, people often disagree about the compatibility of diVerent social and policy aims. Can you promote achievement by being more generous to the needy (e.g., by increasing social beneWts)? Can you promote personal freedoms at the same time as attempting to protect national security (e.g., through anti-terror legislation)? Can you promote freedom of choice while protecting the sanctity of life (e.g., in issues of euthanasia, abortion, and animal rights). The answers to these questions depend on access to an underlying mental representation of how diVerent values and ideals are interrelated. Our view is that, for the most part, people possess a common representation of these compatibilities and conXicts, and the frequent debates arise primarily because of diVerences in the relative importance of values and the methods of pursuing them. The present research identiWes important limitations of past eVorts to uncover such a latent mental representation of values and attempts to identify this representation more powerfully.
Values and Inter-Value Structure
All aspects of individuals' everyday lives are inXuenced by human values (e.g., freedom and equality). People rely on these values by using them implicitly or explicitly to determine their future directions and justify their past actions, compare themselves with others, praise or blame themselves and others, take certain actions over other people and inXuence them, and rationalize their attitudes and behaviour (Feather, 1992; Rohan, 2000; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992) . Indeed, this view is built into two of the most widely used deWnitions of values: Rokeach (1973, p. 5) proposed that "values are enduring beliefs that a speciWc mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of ଝ We thank Lee Fabrigar, GeoV Haddock, Tony Manstead, Russell Spears, Ulrich von Hecker, and three anonymous reviewers for their comments at diVerent stages of the research.conduct or end-state of existence", and Schwartz (1994, p. 21) indicated that values are "desirable transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity". Building on these views, research has found that values are important bridging constructs between personality traits and attitudes (Olson & Maio, 2003; Yik & Tang, 1996) , and are among the most important predictors of behaviour and attitudes (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Maio & Olson, 1995; Rokeach, 1973) . Research has also suggested that values are somewhat stable and resistant to change (Rokeach, 1985; Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989 ) but nonetheless sensitive to contextual inXuences (e.g., Maio & Olson, 1998) . Furthermore, values are inter-generationally transmitted (SchonpXug, 2001; Whitbeck & Gecas, 1988) , and cherished across cultures (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 1994) .
Although the enormous set of Wndings related to values leaves no doubt about the inXuence of basic values on almost all aspects of human life, it may seem diYcult to interpret the Wndings within a single nomological net. Interpretation requires a theory about the structure (representation) of values and value conXicts in the human mind. Early models about the structure of values (e.g., Feather, 1975; Rokeach, 1973) laid the groundwork for a comprehensive structural model provided by Schwartz (1992) . The starting point for this model is the assumption that values are representations of three universal requirements of human beings: individuals' biological needs, coordinated social interaction, and group eYciency and survival. This assumption led Schwartz (1992) to form a model of 10 motivational value types. Table 1 lists the value types, their deWnitions, and their constituent values. As the table shows, each value type arises from the three universal human needs and can be expressed in several abstract values. For example, "benevolence" values are rooted in social interaction needs and express concern for the preservation and enhancement of the welfare of close others, and "self-direction" values are derived from organismic and interactional requirements and involve a preference for autonomy, creativity, and freedom.
More relevant to our aims, the domains can be arranged in a circular structure that reXects compatibilities and conXicts between values. In this structure, value domains that serve compatible motivational goals are adjacent, whereas value domains that serve incompatible motivational goals are opposite. For example, as shown in Fig. 1 , values in the benevolence value domain (e.g., honest and loyal) are adjacent to values in the universalism domain (e.g., social justice and unity with nature), because both sets of values promote coordinated social interaction and group survival. Values in the benevolence value domain are plotted opposite to values in the achievement (e.g., successful and ambitious) domain, because achievement values promote personal welfare, rather than shared welfare with others. In contrast, values that are at right angles to benevolence values in this circular structure are held to serve conceptually orthogonal motives for innovation and progress (stimulation and self-direction values) or personal and group safety (security values). Consequently, people who consider benevolence values to be highly important should not be more or less likely to consider stimulation or tradition values to be highly important. This type of prediction from the circular model has received repeated support in smallest space analyses of ratings of the importance of values in over 200 samples from 60 countries (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000) , supporting Schwartz's predictions about motivational conXicts and compatibilities between values. Because this model provides a single nomological net to merge diverse research on values across cultures, it could be argued that Schwartz's (1992) model of value structure is the most important recent development in research on values. Table 1 Motivational Types of Values, Adapted from Schwartz (1992) 
Unresolved Issues in Extant Tests of Inter-Value Structure
Despite the abundant evidence supporting the circular model, there are important limitations on the extent to which the data actually reveal motivational conXicts and compatibilities between values. In other words, it is diYcult to use the available evidence to extrapolate the real structure of values in people's minds. One obstacle is presented by the smallest space analyses themselves, which are limited in their utility for detecting circular representations (Fabrigar, Visser, & Browne, 1997) . Nonetheless, a more basic limitation is that the data rely exclusively on explicit value judgements. By themselves, explicit value judgements provide an important tool for identifying value importance, but their utility is attenuated by the fact that people may consciously adjust these ratings to be compatible with salient motives. For example, just as self-report measures of attitudes and personality can be aVected by socially desirable response biases, so too can reports of values (Feather, 1975; Fisher & Katz, 2000; Schwartz, Verkasalo, Antonovsky, & Sagiv, 1997) .
These value judgements can also be aVected by the desire to appear consistent to the researcher and to the self. To maximize consistency, people may adjust their value ratings to be compatible with their theories about how each value conXicts with or supports the other values that they have just rated or are about to rate. People may be guided by their conscious theories of compatibility, similar to the way in which people use their implicit theories in autobiographical recall more generally (Ross & McFarland, 1988) . Value measurements may partly reXect conscious theories about conXicts and compatibilities between values, and these theories may or may not reXect the actual conXicts and compatibilities within the mental organization of values. This potential split between conscious theories of mental constructs and the actual organisation of them is now a virtual law of human social cognition (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 2002; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) and memory (Carroll, Nelson, & Kirwan, 1997; Leonesio & Nelson, 1990 ) and provides a powerful argument for examining the mental organisation of values in a diVerent way.
An additional argument for a novel approach is that the elicited patterns of relations between values may be driven more by access to shared semantic associations than by a parallel access to underlying goals. Quillian (1969) proposed that knowledge about the meaning of words and concepts is stored in a hierarchical network structure, wherein the meaning of a concept is deWned partly by its relations to other concepts. That is, concepts are categorized in nodes in a hierarchical network and their meanings are deWned not only by concepts stored in each node (e.g., canary and yellow), but also by concepts in a higher level of structure (e.g., bird). As a result, activation of a concept in memory spreads to connected nodes (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Meyer, 1970) , which enable people to judge more quickly the closeness of concepts when there are fewer nodes between them than when there are more nodes between them (Chang, 1986; Gold & Robbins, 1979; Kounios, Montgomery, & Smith, 1994) . Also, retrieval of semantically related concepts is quicker than retrieval of concepts that are semantically unrelated (Collins & Quillian, 1969; Thomsen, Lavine, & Kounios, 1996) .
The implications of this semantic network for the use of explicit value inter-relations are straightforward. People may begin a value survey by accessing (a) the meaning of the Wrst value and (b) their motivation to achieve it. The activation of this value's meaning should then spread to values that have highly relevant semantic representations, including highly compatible and conXicting values. Ratings of these subsequent values could be adjusted up or down based on their semantic relations to the original value. That is, conceptual synonyms should be judged as being of similar importance, while conceptual antonyms should be judged as being of dissimilar importance. This process would not require access to the motivation or drive activated by each value; motivation could be accessed only during responses to the Wrst few values (or even to the very Wrst value alone). In other words, it could be argued that participants access their motivation regarding each value only at the outset of the survey and then use diVerences between their concept meanings to generate ratings of importance for subsequent values. So, the circular structure could represent diVerences between the meanings of values, rather than diVerences in the actual importance of values as guiding principles in the individuals' lives. The present research addresses these issues by examining the associations between values in memory. (Schwartz, 1994, p.45) . Dashed lines are used to delineate the region occupied by the value type "hedonism," because Schwartz (1992) indicates that this value type is related to both of the adjacent value types and can be considered as part of both. 
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 tested the circular structure of values by examining whether the speed of judging the importance of a value is aVected by its motivational relation to a previously presented value, in a manner consistent with Schwartz's (1992) circular model. Abundant evidence indicates that the speed of judgement after a prior judgment reXects the degree of association between the two judgments in memory (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; RatcliV & McKoon, 1981) . Thus, if the circular model reXects the actual organisation of values in memory (and not just conscious theories), rating the importance of a value should facilitate faster ratings of a second value more strongly in pairs of values that the model holds to be highly compatible or conXicting than in pairs of values that are held to be unrelated. As assumed by the circular model, value distance was deWned as the number of lower order value domains separating the two values in a pair (see Table 2 ).
Method Participants
Forty-four undergraduate psychology students (30 women and 14 men) at CardiV University participated for course credit.
Procedure
Participants took part individually. They were told that the session included two parts. First, they were asked to read a list of 48 values from the Schwartz (1992) Value Survey with the adjacent deWnitions of the values. After 5 min studying the text, participants were shown 24 trials on the computer screen, with 4 trials as practice. Each trial included two values, and each value appeared only once across the trials. Table 2 shows each value pair. The same pairs were presented across participants, but in diVerent orders across trials. The order of presentation of values within the pairs was also counterbalanced across participants, such that participants received either "Domain 1" or "Domain 2" values Wrst, as shown in Table 2 .
Participants were asked to rate the importance of each value as a guiding principle in their lives, using keys labelled from 0 (not important to me) to 3 (extremely important to me). The presentation of the second value occurred immediately after rating the Wrst value. To prevent interference across trials, participants were asked to count downward from a speciWc number (e.g., 87) in set decrements (e.g., 3) for 10 s after responding to each value pair. The starting numbers and decrements were diVerent across the pairs, but the same for all participants. Sentences were presented using Medialab 2002, and reaction times were recorded using Direct Reaction Time Software 2002, which is able to record accurately to 1 ms. After completing the experiment, participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
Multiple regression was used to examine the eVect of the distance between value pairs on the time needed to rate the second value in the pair. Because our design involved many trials within-subjects, we could have employed within-subjects analyses and compared results across participants, between-subjects analyses and compared results across trials, or an analysis that utilized the variance within-and between-subjects (Michela, 1990) . As recommended by Michela (1990) , we chose to perform a curvilinear regression analysis that examined each trial across participants, while entering centred value distance, squared centred value distance (see Aiken & West, 1991) , and 43 dummy variables Fig. 2 , participants took less time to rate the importance of the second value in pairs of values from the same and opposed domains than from unrelated domains. In other words, judgements of value importance were facilitated by prior judgement of a motivationally related value, regardless of whether its aim was similar to the target value or opposed to it. These Wndings support the circular model (Fig. 3) .
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, our examination of value structure utilized an identical prediction for values from adjacent and opposed value domains. An important exception should occur when people are asked to choose which of two values is more important. In this relative judgment task, people should take longer to decide between two values that serve similar motives than to decide between two values that serve opposing motives. In both cases, it would be easy to access simultaneously the importance of each value in the pair, but the relative importance should be clearer when the values conXict. Values that serve compatible motives are often similar in importance, whereas values that serve opposing motives tend to be dissimilar in importance (Schwartz, 1992) , making it easier to identify the more important value in the latter case. Again, as in Experiment 1, the key variable is not the actual importance of the value; it is the speed of the judgment. This time, however, a negative linear correlation between value distance and reaction time should occur. In other words, we predicted that participants would take more time to choose between the less distant values in a pair than between the more distant values in a pair, with reaction times for moderately distant value pairs in between.
A second aim of Experiment 2 was to use an additional, more direct measure of value distance. In Experiment 1, we deWned value distance as the number of lower order value domains separating the two values in each pair. This operationalization relied on Schwartz's (1992) theoretical grouping of values into 10 lower order value domains. A more precise way of deWning value distances is to measure the actual angle between the two values of each pair within the circular structure (see Table 2 ). We used the angle measure in Experiment 2.
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Method Participants
Fifty-two students (33 female and 19 male) at CardiV University participated for £3 payment.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. They were told that the study includes two parts. First, they were asked to read a list of 48 values from the Schwartz (1992) Value Survey with the adjacent deWnitions of the values. After 5 min on this task, participants were shown 24 trials on the computer screen, with 4 trials as practice. Each trial presented one value on the left side of the screen and another one on the right side. The 20 pairs of values were constructed in the same manner as in Experiment 1 (see Table 2 ). Participants used two keys on the computer keyboard to indicate which value in each pair was more important to them as a guiding 
Results and Discussion
Similar to Experiment 1, we conducted a curvilinear regression analysis that utilized centred value distance, squared centred value distance, and 51 dummy variables (each representing one participant) as predictors of reaction times to the value choices. Results indicated a signiWcant negative linear eVect of value distance, B D ¡350.00, t (987) D ¡9.01, p < .001, and the curvilinear eVect of value distance was not signiWcant, B D 45.41, t (986) D .98, ns. That is, participants took more time to react to trials including highly related values than to trials including opposing values, with reaction times to unrelated values falling in between. These results are consistent with the circular model, because it should take more time to choose a value from a pair of values that serve the same motive than between values that serve opposing, distinct goals of diVerent importance to the individual.
Experiment 3
Thus far, the results of these experiments are consistent with Schwartz's (1992) predictions about motivational compatibility and conXict between values. Nonetheless, the results do not rule out an eVect of shared semantic representations. As indicated in the introduction, we expect that the circular model is a joint function of latent motivational compatibility and conXict and of the semantic associations between values. To provide clearer support for the role of motivational relations, it is important to show that predicted value compatibilities and conXicts predict the speed of value judgement independently of participants' perceptions of semantic relatedness. This issue was investigated in our third experiment. Experiment 3 addressed this aim using a paradigm that was a modiWcation of our Wrst experiment, by including our measure of angle distances separating values and a new measure, which asked participants to indicate the semantic relatedness of pairs of values. In Experiment 3, participants completed the value importance trials from Experiment 1 and then judged the semantic relatedness of the same value pairs. We expected to Wnd a curvilinear eVect of value distance on speed of value judgement, as in Experiment 1. Moreover, we expected that this eVect would remain signiWcant after controlling for participants' judgements of semantic relatedness.
Method Participants
Forty-eight undergraduate psychology students (31 female and 17 male) at CardiV University participated for course credit.
Procedure
Participants took part individually. They were told that the study included three parts. First, they were asked to read a list of 46 values from the Schwartz (1992) Value Survey, with the adjacent deWnitions of the values.
2 After 5 min studying the text, participants completed 23 value importance trials from Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, reaction times for the second value in each pair were recorded for our principal analysis. In a third task, participants completed judgements of the values' semantic relatedness. That is, for each value pair, participants were asked to rate the extent to which the values were related in meaning, using a 4-point scale on the computer keyboard from 0 (not related) to 3 (extremely related). The speed of this rating was recorded. After completing this task, participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed. The instruments for presenting the trials and recording data were the same as in Experiment 1, although we also took steps to use the actual angles between the two values of each value pair as a more precise measure of value distance (see Footnote 1).
Result and Discussion
We Wrst conducted a regression analysis with centred value distance, squared centred value distance, and 47 dummy variables (each representing one participant) as predictors of the speed of rating the second value in each pair. As expected, the results indicated a signiWcant negative curvilinear eVect of value distance, B D ¡103.49, t (766) D ¡4.49, p < .001, and the linear eVect of value distance was not signiWcant, B D 18.34, t (767) D 1.02, ns.
We then examined the eVect of perceived semantic relatedness on the speed of rating the second value in each pair. In this analysis, we entered centred perceived semantic relatedness, squared centred perceived semantic relatedness, and 47 dummy variables (each representing one participant) as predictors of the speed of rating of the second value in each pair. Consistent with the broader literature on semantic memory eVects, the results revealed a signiWcant negative linear relation between perceived semantic relatedness and the speed of rating the second values, B D ¡97.64, t (810) D ¡5.58, p < .001, strongly supporting the validity of our measure. We did not expect a curvilinear eVect of semantic relatedness on reaction times, and this eVect was not obtained, B D ¡11.90, t (809) D ¡.61, ns.
To further examine the validity of the semantic relatedness measure, we correlated perceived semantic relatedness with the discrepancy in value importance between the two values of each pair. Based on the assumption that semantically related values should be perceived as similarly important, we hypothesized a negative relation between semantic relatedness and value discrepancies, and this prediction was supported by our data, r (862) D ¡.26, p < .001. Thus, this evidence provided a second source of support for the validity of our measure of semantic relatedness. 
General Discussion
The purpose of the present experiments was to investigate the latent structure of social values in memory. Experiments 1 and 2 obtained results consistent with Schwartz's (1992) circular model of motivational relations between values. That is, the experiments found that the speed of value ratings (Experiment 1) and value preference judgments (Experiment 2) in pairs of values could be predicted from the compatibilities and conXicts between values in the circular model. Experiment 3 found that the hypothetical compatibilities and conXicts predicted the speed of value importance judgments over and above the eVect of the perceived semantic relations among values.
As we noted earlier, this evidence is important partly because the circular model has the potential to help integrate a large amount of evidence about antecedents and consequences of values. Past support for the circular model relied mostly on theoretically consistent correlations between self-reports of value importance, and these correlations could have been driven by participants' conscious theories about value conXicts and by their perceptions of semantic relations between values. The present data do not possess these limitations and provide a novel source of support for the circular model. At the same time, we obtained evidence regarding two diVerent sources of the obtained value relations: motivational relatedness and semantic relatedness. The results provide stronger evidence for a dynamic conceptual structure of values based on their relation to motives that vary in compatibility.
Taken together, the results of our experiments strongly support the validity of Schwartz's (1992) Schwartz (1992) reports that 44 of the 56 values in the circular model show a consistent location in a speciWed lower order value domain across cultures. 5 The lack of consistency for 12 of the values suggests that it is important to take cultural and group diVerences into consideration when it comes to relations between values and value dependent constructs (e.g., attitudes and behaviour).
Nevertheless, the present results have potential implications for understanding value-related behaviour. Of particular relevance is our discovery of close ties in memory between motivationally compatible values. Given this result, it is likely that priming a single value should often activate other related values. As a consequence, value activation may have complex eVects on value-related attitudes and behaviours that have not yet been detected. For example, priming "national security" may aVect behaviours that are related to similar conservation motives (e.g., devotion to a custom or tradition), but are not directly related to the value itself. This potential impact can be predicted only by understanding the associations between values in memory.
It is worth noting that such eVects could not be detected in past research, because past research has focused on activating one value and measuring one behaviour. For example, in past research examining "automaticity" processes in behaviour, experiments have shown that subliminally activation of diVerent values can increase the performance of relevant behaviours that support the value (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel, 2001; Macrae & Johnston, 1998) . Similar eVects of priming single values have been obtained in other research focusing on the values concept (Roccas, 2003; Verplanken & Holland, 2002) . In contrast, our experiments examined a variety of values for each participant and found that priming a value increases the activation of closely related values. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether value priming operates in the same manner when other values are not simultaneously salient, and it is worth considering that inter-value associations may vary between cultures and between participants in a culture. These issues merit further research. 3 Additionally, we found that speed of judgement of the second value was facilitated by smaller discrepancies in value importance between the two values of each value pair, r(862) D .12, p < .001. The same was also true for Experiment 1, r(797) D .10, p < .001. 4 Though not directly germane to our assessment of inter-value structure in memory, we tested whether values that are more closely located in the circular structure are rated as less discrepant in importance. As expected, there was a signiWcant positive correlation between value distance and the absolute magnitude of discrepancies in value importance across value pairs, r(814) D .07, p < .05. This result also occurred in Experiment 1, r (818) D .14, p < .001, using the simple count of lower order value domains that separated values in each pair. These results are consistent with the prior examinations of value structure, which used value distance and self-reports of value importance as variables. 5 Of the 38 values used across our experiments (see Table 2 ), seven were not included in Schwartz's (1992) list of the 44 values that have highly stable inter-value relations across cultures: having fun, social recognition, intelligent, healthy, happiness, detachment, and a stimulating life.
To summarise, the present experiments revealed strong associations between values in memory that are consistent with the motivational compatibilities and conXicts posited in the circular model of values, while showing that perceived semantic relations are not suYcient to explain the associations between values in memory. These results indicate that it may be problematic to focus on single values in isolation. Through their existence within a larger motivational network, the impact of social values on behaviour may be intricate and far-reaching. The present research strengthens the empirical foundation for predicting these diverse eVects.
